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Abstract
We model the choice behaviour of an agent who suffers from imperfect atten-
tion. We define inattention axiomatically through preference over menus and en-
dowed alternatives: an agent is inattentive if it is better to be endowed with an alter-
native a than to be allowed to pick a from a menu in which a is is the best alterna-
tive. This property and vNM rationality on the domain of menus and alternatives
imply that the agent notices each alternative with a given menu-dependent prob-
ability (attention parameter) and maximises a menu independent utility function
over the alternatives he notices. Preference for flexibility restricts the model to
menu independent attention parameters as in Manzini and Mariotti [19]. Our the-
ory explains anomalies (e.g. the attraction and compromise effect) that the Random
Utility Model cannot accommodate.
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1 Introduction
Consider an agent who is otherwise rational but suffers from imperfect attention, in the
sense that he may fail to notice some alternatives in the menu from which he chooses.
This type of attention failure is standard in the large ‘consideration set’ literature of
psychology, consumer science and economics (see e.g. Eliaz and Spiegler [?], Masatli-
oglu et al. [20], Manzini and Mariotti [19], and the references therein). In this paper we
propose a novel method to model such an agent, and show that the resulting model
can address some prominent anomalies.
The key idea in our definition of imperfect attention is to examine jointly the value
for the agent of two types of objects: menus of possible choices, on the one hand;
and endowed alternatives, namely alternatives that the agent simply ‘has’ without going
through a process of choice, on the other hand.
For a rational and fully attentive agent there is no difference between being en-
dowed with an alternative a and choosing from a menu in which a is one of the best
alternatives. But if the agent can fail to notice a good alternative in a menu, there is
a gap between the value of a menu and the value of the best alternative in it (i.e. the
value of that alternative when it is endowed). In particular, this agent must be strictly
better off in the situation in which he is endowed with a than in the situation in which
he can pick from a menu containing it. Combined with vNM rationality (defined over
an appropriate domain), this single property of inattention characterises the implied
choices frommenus in a way that significantly generalises the model in [19].
The endowed alternative could have for, example, the nature of a default option.
Imagine the chooser of a health insurance scheme. A specific health plan is the default
one selected by the public authority. We compare two situations, the one in which the
agent is automatically enrolled in this plan, and the one in which he chooses from the
market. Our key axiom in this example says that an inattentive agent is strictly better
off when he is assigned the default plan than when he has the opportunity to actively
choose it, if the default plan happens to be the best choice for the agent.
This is evidently a minimal and ‘reduced form’ definition of imperfect attention.
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It ignores the details of any underlying information discovery or search process. It
ignores the specific features of the alternatives that may render them more or less
salient. Yet, it captures a core aspect of imperfect attention. We show that, in the pres-
ence of vNM rationality, imperfect attention defined in this way can be represented by
a probability distribution on alternatives in eachmenu (expressing the probability with
which each alternative is noticed) and the value of alternatives is captured by utilities
in such a way that:
 Utility is maximised over the stochastic ‘consideration set’ of alternatives, deter-
mined by the attention distribution.
 The attention distribution can be menu-dependent but it satisfies the constraint
that the probability of noticing an alternative cannot be enhanced by adding a
top alternative1 to the menu.
 The attention distribution in each menu is stochastically independent: the proba-
bility of noticing any group of alternatives in a menu is the product of the ‘atten-
tion parameters’ (probabilities) for those alternatives.
 Menu-independence of the attention parameters is equivalent to a form of pref-
erence for flexibility (the agent is better off with larger menus).
More specifically, we imagine that there exists a known preference ranking % of
riskless alternatives a, menus x (sets of riskless alternatives), and non-trivial lotteries
with as and xs as consequences. The relation % expresses ordinal comparisons of how
well off the agent is in certain situations.2. Thus, we consider statements such as ‘it is
better to choose from menu x rather than from menu y’; or ‘it is better to choose from
1There is a technical ambiguity here regarding the exact meaning of ‘top alternative’ when there are
indifferences in the preference ranking - we resolve the ambiguity before the statement of theorem 1.
2Let us assume for the moment that % is either an ‘objective’, normative betterness ranking, or (if
a choice-based interpretation of % is desired) the preference of an entity whose interests are entirely
aligned with those of the agent (such as a parent or a benevolent planner). Interpreting % as the pref-
erence over menus of the same individual that makes the choice from menus presents some conceptual
difficulties. The tension is created because if an attention deficit implies that % does not represents
preferences truthfully, it is in this sense unreliable; while if % reports preferences accurately, then why
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menu x than having alternative a’; or ‘it is better to have a fifty-fifty chance of choosing
from menu x or getting a for sure, than getting b for sure’. Notably, we do not consider
ranking menus of lotteries, just lotteries of menus.3
The restriction of % to the set of menus is analogous, for example, to the ranking
provided by a standard indirect utility function, while the restriction of % to the set of
riskless alternatives is the ranking provided by the utility function. We seek to infer
properties of the implied choice process based on the properties of %.
The axiom defining imperfect attention in our approach says that a  x for any
menu x that contains alternatives not better than a (possibly including a itself). The
logic, as explained, is that if the agent is not perfectly attentive, he can fail to consider
a (or any alternative to which a is indifferent) when choosing from x, possibly ending
up choosing some b 2 x for which a  b.
Combinedwith the von NeumannMorgenstern axioms, this definition of imperfect
attention leads to an evaluation of menus in which the implicit choice from menus is
stochastic and occurs in the following manner. Each alternative a in menu x is noticed
with amenu-dependent probability (the attention parameter) α (a, x) and is evaluated by
a menu-independent utility value u (a). Then, given some secondary ranking of indif-
ferent alternatives (which could be interpreted, for example, as the order with which
alternatives come to the agent’s attention), the agent picks the highest ranked of the
highest utility alternatives among those which he has noticed. For example, if there
are three alternatives a, b and c with u (a) > u (b) = u (c) and b is ranked above c in
the secondary ranking, the value of the menu fa, b, cg is
u (fa, b, cg) = α (a, fa, b, cg) u (a)
+ (1  α (a, fa, b, cg)) α (b, fa, b, cg) u (b)
+ (1  α (a, fa, b, cg)) (1  α (b, fa, b, cg)) α (c, fa, b, cg) u (c)
+ (1  α (a, fa, b, cg)) (1  α (b, fa, b, cg)) (1  α (c, fa, b, cg)) u (?)
would the decision maker miss relevant alternatives when choosing from the menu that he could see
when picking menus? We address this issue in section 6.2.
3In this respect the task of ranking objects is easier than in much of the recent menu choice literature
that extends Kreps [17]. See Ortoleva [24] for a recent exception.
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where u (?) is the utility of a default alternative which is consumed if nothing is no-
ticed. The implicit choice from fa, b, cg is determined by the agent noticing a (with the
probability given by the attention parameter) and choosing it irrespective of whatever
else is noticed, or missing a and picking b if noticed, either because c is not noticed
or because c is noticed but while equally good it is lower ranked than b, and so on.
In our representation (theorem 1) the menu-dependence of the attention parameters
is limited. Specifically, it cannot be the case that α (b, fa, b, cg) > α (b, fb, cg): that is,
adding a better alternative to a menu cannot increase the attention paid to the existing
alternative.
Next, we explore conditions that limit menu dependence further. We consider the
requirement that, adding a top alternative to a menu must make the agent better off.
While this may look like just a rationality axiom, we allow for the possibility that
adding a weakly best alternative makes the agent strictly better off, something that can
only happen if the agent is less likely to miss one of the best alternatives when there are
more of them. This additional requirement has sharp implications for the underlying
cognitive process: it is equivalent to the property that the attention paid to an alterna-
tive in a menu can be taken to be completely insensitive to which other alternatives are
available (theorem 2).
Moreover, since the requirement is immediately seen to be equivalent to a strict
version of preference for flexibility, the result also sheds new light on a standard axiom
of the menu preference literature. In our setting strict preference for flexibility is not
related to unforeseen contingencies but rather to a property of attention.
Finally, we show in section 5 that the model we propose handles in a simple way
observed anomalies of choice, notably involving failures of Regularity (the property
that the introduction of new alternatives in a menu reduces the probability of choosing
already existing alternatives) that are otherwise difficult to explain - for example, the
leading class of Random Utility Models (RUM) implies Regularity.
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2 The Model
Let X be a finite set of alternatives, denoted a, b, c, .... Any subset x  X is called a
menu. Let X be the set of all menus, with the empty set ? interpreted as the decision
maker missing all the alternatives (e.g. walking away from the shop, abstaining from
voting, exceeding the time limit for a move in a game of chess).4
Let ∆ (X [ X ) be the set of lotteries on X [ X . To simplify notation we identify the
degenerate lotteries in ∆ (X [ X ) with elements of X [ X .
The interpretation of an a 2 X is that it the agent is endowedwith a (e.g. a consump-
tion bundle), without having to pick it from a menu, while an x 2 X is interpreted as
the situation in which the agent has to choose an element from x (e.g. having to pick
a consumption bundle from a competitive budget). Finally, a non-degenerate element
of ∆ (X [ X ) is interpreted as a risky situation in which the agent either has to pick an
element from one menu or is endowed with one alternative, the identity of the menu
or the alternative to be determined probabilistically (e.g. in the consumer theory ex-
ample, the consumer faces uncertain prices and/or income). The empty set accounts
for inattention: obtaining ? means that the agent is so inattentive that he selects no
alternative from the menu.
A preference relation is a binary relation% on ∆ (X [ X ), where g0 % g for any g, g0 2
∆ (X [ X ), interpreted as ‘the agent is better off when facing situation g0 than when
facing situation g’.
We consider the following properties for a preference relation % (with  and 
denoting the asymmetric and symmetric parts, respectively):
A0 - Choosing is better than not choosing: x  ? for all x 2 X .
A1 - Order: % is a weak order.
A2 - Continuity: For all g, g0, g00 2 ∆ (X [ X ) such that g00 % g % g0, there exists
α 2 [0, 1] such that αg00 + (1  α) g0  g.
4Other papers have considered the possibility of ‘not choosing’ in the deterministic case, see Clark
[6] or more recently Gerasimou [11].
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A3- Independence: For all g, g0, g00 2 ∆ (X [ X ) and α 2 [0, 1]: g % g0 ) αg +
(1  α) g00 % αg0 + (1  α) g00.
A4 - Imperfect attention: For all x 2 X and a 2 X: a % b for all b 2 x ) a  x.
A0 is essentially a definition of the range of choice situations we consider, namely
ones in which the menus are ‘opportunity sets’ in the sense that they contain alter-
natives better than not choosing. A1-A3 are simply the von Neumann Morgenstern
axioms applied to the particular domain of menus and alternatives. Finally A4 states
that being endowed with any a is strictly preferable to choosing from a menu con-
taining alternatives that are no better than a (including a itself). As explained in the
introduction, we consider this ranking as the essence of imperfect attention.
Definition 1 A relation % on ∆ (X [ X ) that satisfies A0-A4 is called a rational inattention
preference (r.i.p.).
In the sequel we link a r.i.p. to a numerical representation that suggests a specific
cognitive mechanism underlying the process of choice, the one discussed in the intro-
duction.
A strict total order ˆ of X refines % if a  b) aˆb. We abuse notation by identify-
ing degenerate lotteries on an outcome with the outcome itself.
Definition 2 A vNM attention representation for % is a triple (ˆ, u, α) with ˆ a strict total
order of X that refines %, u : ∆ (X [ X ) ! R a vNM utility function representing %, and
α : X [ X ! (0, 1), such that, for all x 2 X :5
u (x) = ∑
a2x
∏
b2x:bˆa
(1  α (b, x)) α (a, x) u (a) +∏
a2x
(1  α (a, x)) u (?) (1)
In this representation the value of the menu for an agent is expressed by means of
an evaluation function u that assigns a utility value to individual alternatives: this is
the value for the agent of being endowed with the alternative, and it is this value that
the agent maximises on the set of alternatives that are both feasible and noticed. The
function α is a menu-dependent attention function that assigns a value to the attention
5We use the convention that the product over the empty set is equal to one.
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received by each alternative in each menu: the interpretation is that any alternative a
has a chance 1  α (a, x) of being ‘missed’ by the agent in menu x. The strict ordering
ˆ breaks indifferences in%. It can be interpreted as the order in which the alternatives
in each indifference class present themselves for potential consideration by the agent
(who may or may not notice them).
3 Analysis
It is easy to see that, even without any restriction on the attention function, not all
% have a vNM attention representation. Suppose for example that a % b and that
fa, bg  a. Then if there were a vNM attention representation, we would have the
contradiction
α (a, fa, bg) u (a) + (1  α (a, fa, bg)) α (b, fa, bg) u (b)
+ (1  α (a, fa, bg)) (1  α (b, fa, bg)) u (?)
> u (a)  u (b)
Even if we weakened this to a % b and fa, bg % a, the agent would have to have per-
fect attention at least for one alternative, a case also excluded from the representation.6
So, requiring that endowment is better than choice (A4), which excludes this prefer-
ence pattern, is necessary for the representation. The content of our first result is that,
6In fact this case would require that either a is strictly better than b and its coefficient is one, or a
and b are indifferent and the coefficient for b is one. To see this, suppose first a  b, so that u (a) =
u (b) = u¯. Then fa, bg % a would require βu¯+ (1  β) u (?)  u¯ with β = α (a, fa, bg) + α (b, fa, bg) 
α (a, fa, bg) α (b, fa, bg), which is not possible unless β = 1, ruled out by assumption. So let a  b and
fa, bg  a. The latter requires
α (a, fa, bg) u (a) + (1  α (a, fa, bg)) α (b, fa, bg) u (b)
+ (1  α (a, fa, bg)) (1  α (b, fa, bg)) u (?)
= u (a),
(1  α (a, fa, bg)) (α (b, fa, bg) u (b) + (1  α (b, fa, bg)) u (?))
= (1  α (a, fa, bg)) u (a)
which can hold only if α (a, fa, bg) = 1.
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together with A0 and the vNM axioms, A4 is also sufficient: in other words, condi-
tional on vNM rationality the preference of endowment over choice is equivalent to the
specific representation we are considering.
However, we can go further than that. The additional twist is that a r.i.p. also
limits the way attention for an alternative may depend on the menu. In principle, one
may imagine that adding an alternative to a menu increases the attention paid to an
existing alternative. This could be hypothesised to be the case, for example, when the
new alternative is similar to the existing one. But, as it turns out, if preferences are r.i.p.
this effect can be excluded in some cases, namely when the new alternative is better
than the existing ones. Preferences have a vNM attention representation if and only if
they have a vNM attention representation in which the addition of a new top alternative
to a menu cannot increase the attention received by any of the existing alternatives. Here,
‘top alternative’ means either ‘strictly better than the existing alternatives’, or ‘weakly
better than the existing alternatives and top ranked in the secondary ranking ˆ’.
Theorem 1 The relation % is a rational inattention preference if and only if it has a vNM
attention representation (ˆ, u, α) in which α satisfies the monotonicity condition
bˆa for all a 2 x ) α (a, x)  α (a, x [ fbg) for all a 2 x.
The monotonicity condition in the statement obviously holds for a standard deci-
sion maker (for whom α (a, ) = 1), and is implied for example if the attention para-
meters are formed with a ‘Luce type’ function, α (a, x) =
λ(a)
∑b λ(b)
, where λ is a strictly
positive real valued function of the alternatives (in this case the condition even holds
for non-top alternatives are added to the menu). In section 6.1 we discuss a recent
model by Echenique, Saito and Tserenjigmid [8] which uses a similar formulation.
The proof of the theorem is not difficult but it is long and thus relegated to an
appendix. The logic of the proof is that the axioms enable an iterated ‘peeling off’
procedure that makes any menu x indifferent to a lottery over two outcomes, one of
them being a sub-menu obtained by removing an alternative in x, as follows. Suppose
for simplicity that preferences are strict and number the alternatives in x from best
to worst as x = fa1, ...aKg. Suppose also that x  xn fa1g. Given that a1  x by
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A4, we can construct (thanks to Continuity) a lottery αa1 + (1  α) xn fa1g for some
α 2 (0, 1) that is indifferent to x, so that by the vNM axioms this can be represented
as u (x) = αu (a1) + (1  α) u (xn fa1g) for some vNM utility u. Then we can iterate
the process applying the argument successively to xn fa1g, xn fa1, a2g,..., and show
that the resulting formula has the required properties. The procedure is markedly less
straightforward when xn fa1g % x, but it retains the same flavour.
Observe that r.i.p. may be such that, because of imperfect attention, two menus
x and y of the same cardinality that contain indifferent alternatives (in the sense that
there exists a bijection f from x to y with f (a)  a for all a 2 x) are not necessarily
indifferent. For example, if a  b  c it can be the case that fa, cg  fb, cg. In the
interpretation we are giving preferences, this is not a puzzling phenomenon: the dis-
crepancy in the values of menus that contain indifferent alternatives can be explained
by the different levels of attention received by the alternatives in the two menus. In the
example, α (a, fa, cg) > α (b, fb, cg) and α (c, fa, cg) = α (c, fb, cg) would rationalise
the preference.
A second observation concerns the identifiability of the primitives. As is obvious
from the representation, the same attention parameters work with any positive affine
transformation of u. In general however, while thanks to the vNM axioms u can be
retrieved from preference in a cardinally unique way, it is not possible to pin down
exactly all the attention parameters. There are two reasons for this. On the one hand,
although the monotonicity condition in the representation helps putting some bounds
on them, these conditions depend on the arbitrary completion ˆ of the weak order
%. On the other hand, even if preferences are given by a strict total order, it may not
be possible to pin the vector α down uniquely. We illustrate these points with two
examples, starting with the case of a strict order.
Example 1 Let X = fa, bg, suppose that preferences satisfy A0-A4 and are such that a 
b  fa, bg  fag  fbg, and suppose that u represents preferences with
h 2 X [ X a b fa, bg fag fbg ?
u (.) U pU qpU rU sU 0
where U > 0, p, q, r, s 2 (0, 1) and s < r < qp. It is easy to see (see Appendix B for details)
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that the representation of u (fag), u (fbg) and u (fa, bg), the restriction that α (b, fa, bg) 2
(0, 1) and the monotonicity condition imply
α (a, fa, bg) 2

qp  s
1  s
, qp

Since qp >
qp s
1 s , qp < 1 the interval is not degenerate, and therefore α (a, fa, bg), while
restricted, can never be unique for any configuration of s, q, p.
We conclude that the non-uniqueness of the attention parameters is not caused
solely by the arbitrariness with which ˆ breaks indifferences in . However, as we
show in the next example, whenever ˆ refines , there are additional non-uniqueness
sources: whether the indifference a  b is resolved as aˆb or as bˆa does matter, in the
sense that different admissible ranges for both α (a, x) and α (b, x) may emerge. The
reason for this is simple: once we fix u the values of α on the singletons are determined
uniquely. Then which of them has to go up in the binary sets depends on how the
indifference is broken.
Example 2 Let X = fa, bg, a  b  fa, bg  fag  fbg, with u representing these
preferences and defined as
h 2 X [ X a b fa, bg fag fbg ?
u (.) U U pU pqU pqU 0
with U > 0, p, q 2 (0, 1). The expressions for u (fag) = u (fbg) and u (fa, bg) yield7
α (b, fa, bg) =
p  α (a, fa, bg)
1  α (a, fa, bg)
(2)
with α (a, fa, bg) < p to ensure α (b, fa, bg) > 0. Now consider the case aˆb - the monotonic-
ity condition on α requires that α (b, fa, bg)  α (b, fbg), implying
α (a, fa, bg) 
p (1  q)
1  pq
In short, then, α (a, fa, bg) 2
h
p(1 q)
1 pq , p

6= ? and (2) must hold. If we then consider the
alternative case bˆa, equation (2) must now hold with α (b, fa, bg) 2
h
p(1 q)
1 pq , p

. That
7See Appendix C for details.
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is, while equation (2) establishes the same condition regardless of whether aˆb or bˆa, the
monotonicity condition imposes a different range of values for the attention parameters. For
instance, setting p = 0.6 and q = 0.8, α (a, fa, bg) = 0.2 and α (b, fa, bg) = 0.5, the
requirements for the case aˆb fail (since for that case α (a, fa, bg) 2 [0.23, 0.6)) while those
for bˆa hold (since 0.5 = α (b, fa, bg) 2 [0.23, 0.6) and α (a, fa, bg) = 0.6 0.51 0.5 = 0.2).
Finally, we note that taking e.g. the case aˆb, if we also required α (a, fa, bg)  α (a, fag) =
pq, we would have
p <
2q  1
q2
If q is sufficiently small, the rhs is negative, so that the condition cannot hold.
Note however that the evaluation of a menu is not impacted by the exact choice of
ˆ, as the overall attention enjoyed by alternatives in a menu that belong to the same
indifference class is independent of the choice of ˆ. For menu evaluation purposes,
in this model regardless of how the alternatives within the same indifference class are
ranked by ˆ what matters is the probability that some alternative in a’s indifference
class is noted by the decision maker. There is no bonus for noticing more than one
alternative in any indifference class, given that only the single alternative that is ulti-
mately chosen determines value. So at least in this respect the lack of identification of
the attention parameters does not matter.
The lack of full identifiability of the attention parameters can be completely over-
come by specialising the model, as shown in the next section.
4 Menu independence and preference for flexibility
In this section we study the important special case of the attention model in which the
attention for an alternative a is independent of the menu in which a appears. In the
case of brands, for example, there is some evidence that the salience of each brand is
independent of which other brands are available (van Nierop et al. [23]).
The ‘choice from menu’ properties of the case with menu independent attention
have already been explored in Manzini and Mariotti [19]. Here we are interested in
the menu preference counterpart of this feature: what are the additional properties of
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preferences over menus/alternatives, beside vNM rationality and Imperfect attention,
that permit to assumemenu independent attention? The answer to this questions turns
out to be both simple and interesting, and it hinges on how preferences behave with
respect to expansions of menus.
We have seen that the addition of top alternatives is (weakly) detrimental for the
chance of the existing alternatives to be noticed. This fact points to an important feature
of the representation of theorem 1. Suppose that a % b. This preference is compatible
with the following pattern:
α (b, fa, bg) < α (b, fbg)
1
(1  α (a, fa, bg))
 
α (a, fa, bg)
(1  α (a, fa, bg))
u (a)
u (b)
, α (b, fbg) u (b) > α (a, fa, bg) u (a) + (1  α (a, fa, bg)) α (b, fa, bg) u (b)
, fbg  fa, bg
In other words, for a r.i.p. adding a new best alternative to a menu may decrease the value
of that menu. This can happen if the addition of the new alternative also reduces by a
sufficient amount the attention paid to the best existing alternatives, and provided that
the attention paid to the new top alternative isn’t too large. The following axiom di-
rectly excludes this situation, and in addition it imposes a strict gain from the addition
of a best alternative:
A5 - Best alternative expansion: For all x 2 X and a 2 X: a /2 x and a % b for all
b 2 x ) fag [ x  x.
A5 can be seen in part as a standard rationality requirement, which excludes the
perverse effect described before. There is however a residual component of imperfect
attention in this axiom, in that it allows the possibility that a is indifferent to an existing
best alternative and yet fag [ x  x, while a perfectly attentive and rational agent
should regard the menus fag [ x and x as indifferent in this case. Yet it is possible that
a perfectly rational but imperfectly attentive agent might miss a top alternative with
higher probability when there are fewer of them.
In a vNM attention representation (ˆ, u, α), α is menu independent if, for all x, y 2 X
and for all a 2 x \ y, α (a, x) = α (a, y). In this case we write for simplicity α (a) instead
of α (a, x).
13
Theorem 2 A rational inattention preference% satisfies A5 if and only if it has a vNM atten-
tion representation (ˆ, u, α) in which α is menu independent.
Proof. Necessity. Suppose the representation holds with α menu independent. Let
a /2 x and a % b for all b 2 x. Then observing that x [ fag = fb 2 x : bˆag [ fag [
fb 2 x : aˆbg, we have
u (x [ fag)  u (x) =
= ∑
b2x:bˆa
∏
c2x:cˆb
(1  α (c)) α (b) u (b)
+α (a) u (a) ∏
b2x:bˆa
(1  α (b))
+ (1  α (a)) ∑
b2x:aˆb
∏
c2x:cˆb
(1  α (c)) α (b) u (b) 
+ (1  α (a))∏
b2x
(1  α (b)) u (?)
  ∑
b2x
∏
c2x:cˆb
(1  α (c)) α (b) u (b) ∏
b2x
(1  α (b)) u (?)
= α (a) ∏
b2x:bˆa
(1  α (b))
0BB@ u (a)  ∑b2x:aˆb ∏c2x:cˆb (1  α (c)) α (b) u (b)
  ∏
b2x:aˆb
(1  α (b)) u (?)
1CCA
> 0
where the last inequality follows from the fact that u (a)  u (b) for all b 2 x such
that aˆb and that the sum of the coefficients on the last two terms add up to less than
unity.8
For sufficiency, theorem 1 ensures that % has a vNM attention representation. To
prove that α is menu independent in the representation of the theorem we begin by
proving two claims.
Claim 1: For all x 2 X : a /2 x and a % b for all b 2 x ) α (b, x) = α (b, x [ fag) for all
b 2 x.
8Since
∑
b2x:aˆb
∏
c2x:cˆb
(1  α (c)) α (b) u (b) + ∏
b2x:aˆb
(1  α (b)) <
∑
b2x
∏
c2x:cˆb
(1  α (c)) α (b) u (b) +∏
b2x
(1  α (b)) = 1
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Proof. If A5 holds, the second and third case we have examined in the proof of
theorem 1 (i.e. xn fag % x) are excluded. So the first case x  xn fag applies and yields
α (b, x) = α (b, x [ fag) for all b 2 x. 2
Claim 2: For all x, y 2 X : a /2 x [ y and a % b for all b 2 x [ y) α (a, x) = α (a, y).
Proof. Since by A0 and A4 a  fag  ?, by the vNM axioms there exists a unique
αa,fag 2 (0, 1) such that
fag  αa,faga+

1  αa,fag

?
Similarly, considering any x 2 X such that a /2 x and a % b for all b 2 x, it follows by
A4 and A5 that a  fag [ x  x. By A3 then there exist a unique αa,x 2 (0, 1) such that
fag [ x  αa,xa+

1  αa,fag

x
By Independence it must be
k fag+ (1  k) [fag [ x]
 k
h
αa,faga+

1  αa,fag

?
i
+ (1  k)
h
αa,xa+

1  αa,fag

x
i
=

kαa,fag + (1  k) αa,x

a+ k

1  αa,fag

?+ (1  k)

1  αa,fag

x (3)
for any k 2 (0, 1). Fix one such k. Since it is also the case (by A4) that a  fag and
a  fag [ x, then a  ka+ (1  k) a  k fag+ (1  k) (fag [ x) by Independence. In
addition, also by Independence, k fag+ (1  k) (fag [ x)  k?+ (1  k) x. Therefore
a  k fag+ (1  k) (fag [ x)  k?+ (1  k) x
and, by Continuity there exists a unique γ 2 (0, 1) such that
k fag+ (1  k) (fag [ x)  γa+ (1  γ) [k?+ (1  k) x]
But this is simply expression (3), so that it must be
kαa,fag + (1  k) αa,x

= γ
k

1  αa,fag

= k (1  γ)
(1  k)

1  αa,fag

= (1  γ) (1  k)
9>>>=
>>>;, αa,fag = αa,x
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Applying the same argument to a y 2 X such that a /2 y and a % b for all b 2 y yields
αa,y = αa,fag = αa,x, proving the claim. 2
To prove sufficiency, take x, y 2 X and a 2 x \ y (if a /2 x \ y for all a then there
is nothing to prove). Let xL = fb 2 x : a  bg, enumerate arbitrarily the elements
other than a in xnxL, that is let xnxL = fa, b1, ...bng, and let xi = xL [ fb1, ...big for all
i = 1, ...n where n = jxnxLj   1. Similarly, let yL = fc 2 y : a  cg, ynyL = fa, c1, ...cmg
and let yi = yL [

c1, ...cj
	
for all j = 1, ...m where m = jynyLj   1. Claim 2 im-
plies that α (a, fag [ xL) = α (a, fag [ yL). By Claim 1 we have that α (a, fag [ xL) =
α (a, fag [ x1), and by induction α (a, fag [ xi) = α (a, fag [ xi+1) for all i  n   1,
where of course x = fag [ xn, so that
α (a, x) = α (a, fag [ xL) = α (a, fag [ yL) (4)
A similar reasoning applied to α (a, fag [ yL) yields
α (a, y) = α (a, fag [ yL) = α (a, fag [ xL) (5)
and then by (4) and (5) we conclude α (a, x) = α (a, y).
Preference for flexibility. We can also relate the menu independence of attention pa-
rameters to a version of a classical axiom of the menu choice literature, ‘preference
for flexibility’, which states that the agent is better off when the menu expands (ir-
respective of whether the expansion is by means of top alternatives or not). When
the attention parameters are menu independent, it is easily verified (by a calculation
analogous to the proof of necessity in theorem 2) that for any x and a /2 x, we have
u (x [ fag) > u (x). Therefore the following axiom is necessary in the vNM attention
representation with menu independent attention parameters:
A6 (Strict preference for flexibility): y  x ) x  y.
Since it is also true that A6 directly implies A5 as a special case, we conclude that
it can replace it in the characterisation of theorem 2.9 Strict preference for flexibility is,
9Necessity of A6 is straightforward. Rather than providing a full proof, we show the argument with
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for a vNM rational but inattentive agent, the preference counterpart of menu indepen-
dence in attention:
Corollary 1 A rational inattention preference satisfies Strict preference for Flexibility if and
only if it has a vNM attention representation (ˆ, u, α) in which α is menu independent.
From amethodological perspective, this result is an example of how the samemenu
preference may have different interpretations according to the context. While the clas-
sical interpretation of preference for flexibility is in terms of uncertainty about future
tastes, as we’ve just seen it is also compatible with a specially discplined form of inat-
tention. It is impossible to get to the ‘right’ representation - that is, to the true model of
the cognitive process underlying choice - only on the basis of preferences over menus:
extraneous information of some kind is necessary.
A formula for the attention parameters. Withmenu independent attention for all x 2 X
and with aˆb for all b 2 xn fag:
u (x) = ∑
b2x
∏
c2x:cˆb
(1  α (c)) α (b) u (b) +∏
b2x
(1  α (b)) u (?)
= α (a) u (a) +
+ (1  α (a))
0
@ ∑
b2xnfag
∏
c2xnfag:cˆb
(1  α (c)) α (b) u (b) + ∏
b2xnfag
(1  α (b)) u (?)
1
A
= α (a) u (a) + (1  α (a)) u (xn fag)
and therefore
α (a) =
u (x)  u (xn fag)
u (a)  u (xn fag)
.
This formula is interesting in two respects. First, it shows that in this case the α (a)
are uniquely defined, since they are invariant to any positive affine transformation of u,
and u (as a vNM utility) is unique precisely up to such transformations. Observe that
an example. Consider sets y = fag and x = fa, bg so that u (y) = α (a) u (a) + (1  α (a)) u (?). Then
either u (x) = α (a) u (a) + (1  α (a)) α (b) u (b) + (1  α (a)) (1  α (b)) u (?) (if aˆb, so that u (a) 
u (b)), or u (x) = α (b) u (b) + (1  α (b)) α (a) u (a) + (1  α (a)) (1  α (b)) u (?) (if bˆa and u (b) 
u (a)). Either way, u (x) > u (y) so that x  y.
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for any a 2 x there exists an x with a 2 x and aˆb for all b 2 xn fag, for example
x = fag.
Secondly, the formula provides an interpretation of the attention parameters in
terms of utility. The attention paid to a measures the ratio between the incremental
utility of offering the agent the opportunity of choosing a (from a menu in which a is best),
and the incremental utility of endowing the agent with a instead.
5 Failures of Regularity and the Attraction Effect
Manymodels of stochastic choice satisfy the property of Regularity, which says that the
probability of choosing an alternative does not increase as the menu gets larger. For
example, Regularity is satisfied by the very general Random Utility Model (RUM)10,
and therefore by the version of our model with menu independent attention parame-
ters (which, as shown in Manzini and Mariotti [19], is a particular case of RUM), as
well as by Luce’s [18] classical model, its multinomial logit version (Mc Fadden [22])
popular in econometrics, and also by its recent generalisation by Gul, Natenzon and
Pesendorfer [12]. However, some prominent experimental findings contradict Regu-
larity, in particular the attraction effect and the compromise effect.
Marketers use a number of strategies to manipulate the attractiveness or otherwise
of alternatives. The attraction effect (also known as the ‘asymmetric dominance’ effect,
see Huber and Puto [13], [14]) refers to the fact that the choice frequency of a target
alternative t increases when a newdecoy alternative d is introduced in amenu, with the
property that the d is markedly worse than the target t, while incomparable to a third
(‘other’) alternative, o. This ranking is induced by generally presenting alternatives
as described in two desirable attributes/dimensions: while t and o’s ranking in one
dimension is reversed in the other, d is Pareto dominated by t but Pareto incomparable
to o. The compromise effect instead refers to the introduction of a different type of decoy,
which has the highest degree of one attribute and the lowest of another in such a way
10In a RUM model (Block and Marschack [4]) the agent picks the top element of a ranking extracted
at random according to a known probability distribution.
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that t is now ‘middle ranking’.
However subsequent research has identified various other strategies to increase t’s
choice probability: so the decoy may be Pareto dominated by both t and o, or may
Pareto dominate the target but be unavailable for choice (i.e. ‘phantom’ decoy), and
so on.11 All these effects are easy to accommodate in our setup. From the formula
p (a, A) = α (a, A) ∏
b2A:bˆa
(1  α (b, A)) it follows immediately that p (a, A) increases
with α (a, A) and decreases with α (b, A) for any b 2 A such that bˆa. Now consider
adding a decoy d to a menu. Then, as long as aˆd, we have
p (a, A [ fdg) = α (a, A [ fdg) ∏
b2A:bˆa
(1  α (b, A [ fdg))
where observe that the index set for the product has not changed. So as long as the in-
troduction of d increases the attention paid to alternative a without affecting the atten-
tion paid to the other alternatives (or at least without increasing it too much), we have
p (a, A [ fdg) > p (a, A), while p (b, A [ fdg) < p (b, A) for all b such that aˆb. Even
if bˆawe can still have a decrease in the probability that b is chosen after the introduc-
tion of the decoy alternative, provided that the attention paid to it is decreased by this
event. Indeed, adding a dominated alternative imposes in our model no constraints
on the attention parameters of the existing alternatives. The attractive aspect of this
way of modelling the phenomenon is that this reasoning holds regardless of the type
of decoy that is introduced, whether it is a phantom alternative, or one that induces
11Assume that a and b are on a straight ‘equipreference line’ in a two dimensional space, with the axes
measuring the levels of two desirable attributes, labeled x and y. Suppose that a lies to the North-West of
b. An ‘asymmetrically dominated range decoy’ r for alternative a is an alternativewhich is weakly Pareto
dominated by a, equal to a in one attribute andworse than both a and b in the other attribute; an ‘inferior
decoy’ with a as a target lies below the equipreference line, but has more of one attribute and less than
the other when compared to both a and b, so that it is not strictly dominated by either of them; the
frequency with which a is chosen increases because a is a near dominating alternative. The ‘compromise
decoy’ in favour of a differs from the inferior decoy by lying on or just below the equipreference line,
and makes a look intermediate between b and the decoy. Last, the ‘phantom decoy’ dominates the target
a, but not b. This alternative, though present in the choice set, cannot be chosen; this pushes subjects to
choose the alternative that it dominates (i.e. the target a). See Wedell and Pettibone [30] and Pettibone
and Wedell [25] for a detailed description of the types of decoys and their effects on choice.
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compromise, or a symmetrically dominated alternative, and so on. What conforms to
the intentions of the manipulator and accords with the structure of our model is that
the target alternative is made more attractive not by improvements to it, but simply
by framing - what we call ‘attention’ is whatever it is that the manipulator/marketer
strives to influence.
6 Concluding remarks
6.1 Utility, attention and perception
One feature of our model is that the attention parameters are not correlated with utility
values: higher utility alternatives are not necessarily noticed with a higher probabil-
ity. Though certainly the existence of possible correlations in specific contexts mer-
its further investigation, a lack of correlation is broadly in line with some evidence
(Reutskaya et al. [27], Krajbich and Rangel [16]) and it is also a main feature of the re-
cent model by Echenique, Saito and Tserenjigmid [8] - henceforth EST). We report this
model in some detail, as it shares with ours some of the formalism of the choice from
menu stage, though with a very different interpretation. EST’s ‘Perception Adjusted
Luce Model’ (PALM) has two primitives, a utility function u : X [X ! R and a weak
order %p encapsulating the order with which alternatives are perceived, where a p b
signifies that a is perceived sooner than b (hence%p is termed perception order). For any
x 2 X , u (x) denotes the probability of not choosing any alternative from x. It is simi-
lar to u (?) in our framework, with the important difference that, unlike in our model,
here the utility of not choosing can vary from a choice set to another. Letting xn %p
denote the indifference classes induced by%p on x, a PALM posits that the probability
pp (a, x) that alternative a is chosen from x is
p%p (a, x) = λ (a, x)
0
@ ∏
τ2xn%p :τpa
 
1  ∑
b2x:b2τ
λ (b, x)
!1A
where, for all a 2 x:
λ (a, x) =
u (a)
∑a02x u (a
0) + u (x)
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That is, λ (a, x) is the standard choice probability prescribed by the Luce model ad-
justed to allow for a menu dependent outside option (as captured by u (x)). In other
words, in a PALM the Luce choice probabilities, which depend on the agent’s pref-
erences as encapsulated by u, are ‘modulated’ by a deterministic priority order. The
structure of a PALM and of our model
prip (a, x) = α (a, x) ∏
b2x:bˆa
(1  α (b, x))
are thus formally similar, since when the perception ordering p in a PALM is strict
we have
pp (a, x) = λ (a, x)
0
@ ∏
b2x:bpa
(1  λ (b, x))
1
A
A PALM thus offers an alternative way of interpreting our own implied process of
choice from menus. Our attention function is replaced by a specific functional form
(Luce probabilities) that, depending on u, can fit themonotonicity condition of theorem
1: if b p a for all a 2 x, then λ (a, x)  λ (a, x [ fbg) as long as u (b) + u (x [ fbg) 
u (x), which is compatible with a variety of us. Our monotonicity condition generalises
for example the condition of regularity that EST use in the characterisation,12 and for
menus of two alternatives it is implied by regularity. However ourmodel does not gen-
eralise a PALM, as there are admissible u functions that would imply a contradiction
of the monotonicity condition in theorem 1.
6.2 Interpretation and other related literature
We return to the issue of the interpretation of the menu/alternatives ranking. As we
mentioned in the introduction, the interpretation of this ranking as held by the same
agent who is supposed to make choices frommenus is not straightforward. If the agent
is prone to failing to notice the alternatives in the menu, his ranking of menus will not
express his genuine preference over menus, but rather his biased preference due to his
incomplete powers of attention. On the other hand, if we assumed that somehow the
agent perceives all alternatives at the stage of evaluating menus, it is not clear why the
12See EST for details.
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later stage of a choice from menu may be vitiated by the lack of consideration of some
alternatives. For these reasons, we assumed so far that % expressed either an objective
normative ranking or the ranking of a second decision maker who, while not making
choices from menus, was in a ‘paternalistic’ relation with the agent in the sense that
he (1) had the responsibility of selecting a menu from which the agent would choose,
or to force the agent to consume certain alternatives; (2) knew both the preferences
and the cognitive abilities of the agent; and (3) internalised the agent’s preferences
over alternatives. Such a decision maker could be a policy maker choosing policy
variables that affect the feasible set of the agent, or a doctor (or a parent or a tutor)
setting constraints on the agent’s behaviour. For example, a regulator might regulate
more or less stringently the markets for financial products, houses, health and so on.
The agent might be forced to subscribe to a given pension or health plan, or be offered
the opportunity to pick from plans available in the market.
It is, however, also possible to interpret % as being held by the same agent who
chooses from menus. A first interpretation is that the inattentive agent looks at past
choices from menus and evaluates their results. The agent, at some point after having
made choices from menus, becomes aware of the exact composition of the menus. He
can thus make ‘hindsight’ statements of the type ‘I’ve been better off choosing from
menu x rather than from menu y’, ‘I ended up better off when having a than when I
faced a choice from x’, and so on.
A second possibility, this time ex-ante, that suggests itself is imperfect memory.
Some alternatives may escape the agent’s grasp after he has contemplated the menu
and before the moment of choice. In this interpretation, when the agent evaluates
menus he is aware of his memory imperfection. This interpretation is analogous to the
random availability assumption in Barberá and Grodal [2]. These authors study decision
makers who rank menus, have von Neuman-Morgenstern utility functions over alter-
natives, and attach subjective probabilities to each subset of alternatives surviving to
the stage when the choice from the menu has to be made. For instance, it may be that
at the time when the choice from a menu x is performed the stocks of the preferred
alternatives have run out. Thus the problem facing the agent is that of ranking ex ante
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(so that the choice from the menu is actually not carried out) each choice menu based
on the expected utility calculated taking into account the survival probabilities. In our
context, availability can be interpreted psychologically: it expresses the ability of the
agent to hold in mind the necessary information about the content of the menu. In this
interpretation, too, the distinction between a and fag arises quite naturally, as a cannot,
unlike fag, be not available later, as the agent has been endowed with it (Barberá and
Grodal [2] do not make such a distinction, and their framework is in the vein of Kreps
[17])
A third interpretation, also ex-ante, is in terms of absent mindedness or ‘implemen-
tation errors’ (with self-awareness). In choosing exits from motorways, you know that
it is better to take a given exit, but you are aware that you may end up missing it and
being forced to take an inferior second exit. In this case you might for instance have
to compare situations such as ‘driving and having to choose from {first motorway exit,
second motorway exit}’ (with the risk of choosing suboptimally) and ‘letting someone
else drive’. Absent mindedness as a behavioral phenomenon has been examined by
Piccione and Rubinstein [26] (in a game theoretic context) and the subsequent litera-
ture. Implementation errors in choice are studied by Mattson and Weibull [21] as a
foundation for the logit model. Finally, the possibility of making choices over menus
while contemplating the possibility of making ‘mistakes’ at the time of choice from the
menu is a possible interpretation of frameworks such as Ahn and Sarver [1] and Koida
[15].13 While in that literature the reaction to such mistakes is modeled as a preference
for commitment in the sense of preference for a singleton menu, we admit the possi-
bility of missing an alternative (due to lack of attention) even for a singleton menu. In
this paper, only the endowment of an alternative expresses the sure consumption of
that alternative.
Our interpretation of the concept of inattention is in line with those of Masatlioglu,
Nakajma and Ozbay [20] (MNO) and Manzini and Mariotti [19] (MM). In these pa-
pers inattention simply means failing to notice alternatives in a menu, in line with the
13E.g. in Koida: "Namely, she prefers the restaurant that serves only chicken to the one that serves
both chicken and fish, to avoid “mistakenly” choosing suboptimal alternatives ex post."
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consumer choice literature on ‘consideration sets’. Both papers give a characterisation
of consideration sets models based on a standard ‘revealed preference method’: they
consider the agent’s choices from a set of menus and state conditions under which the
agent’s choices could be interpreted as deriving from a certain type of imperfect at-
tention. MNO focus on deterministic choices and look at a special restriction of the
dependence of attention on the menu. MM study stochastic choices and characterise
the menu independent version of the model proposed in this paper. The ‘rational inat-
tention’ literature started with Sims [29] takes a different view of inattention: the agent
faces uncertainty about the true state of the world and must select, at a cost, an op-
timal signalling structure (a joint distribution on signals and states), on the basis of
which ex-post choices from menus are made. The work by de Oliveira, Denti, Mihm
and Ozbek [7] however is in a broadly similar vein to ours in that it relates inattention
with preference over menus. In particular, it shows how an adaptation and reinter-
pretation of the menu choice approach (notably Ergin and Sarver [10]) can constitute a
decision theoretic foundation for rational inattention.14
6.3 A variant without endowed and default alternatives
We sketch here a variant of our model, which describes a situation in which non-trivial
menus are all ‘large’. This is a natural context in which attention may play a crucial
role. In this variant, singleton alternatives are noticed with probability one, and play
the role of endowed alternatives of the previous sections.
Let X∞ be the set of countably infinite subsets of a set X. Let
X 1 = fx : x = fag for some a 2 Xg
be the set of singleton menus. The interpretation is now that if the agent is faced with
themenu fag hewill not miss a. Inattention only occurs in largemenus. The preference
% is on ∆
 
X∞ [ X 1

.
14In the non-menu preference literature on rational inattention, we should mention the work by
Caplin and Dean [5], who build a model that explains laboratory evidence more closely than the Ran-
dom Utility Model.
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We can apply the same methods of theorem 1 (the proof is the same except we have
to use the mixture space theorem to guarantee the existence of a linear-in-probability
utility function) to obtain a recursive formula for the value of eachmenu using as before
a vNM utility function u, an attention function α, and a tie-breaking order ˆ. For all
x = fa1, a2, ...g with aiˆai+1 and any K = 1, 2, ...we have:
u (x) = α (a1, x) u (a1) + ...+
K
∏
i=1
(1  α (ai, x)) u (xn fa1, ..., aKg)
Here, x is evaluated as before, except that in place of the default alternative when the
first K best alternatives a1, ..., aK are missed there is another menu An fa1, ..., aKg 2 X
∞.
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A Appendix: proof of theorem 1.
Necessity. Suppose % on ∆ (X [ X ) has a vNM attention representation (ˆ, u, α) in
which α satisfies the monotonicity condition. We show that it satisfies A0-A4. Since
α (a, x) 2 (0, 1) for all x 2 X and a 2 x, it follows
u (x) = ∑
a2x
∏
b2x:bˆa
(1  α (b, x)) α (a, x) u (a) +∏
a2x
(1  α (a, x)) u (?) > u (?)
so that A0 holds. The necessity of A1-A3 is standard and thus omitted. Finally, let
a % b for all b 2 x. Then
u (x) = ∑
c2x
∏
c2x:cˆb
(1  α (c, x)) α (b, x) u (b) < u (a)
since the left hand side is a convex combination of values which do not exceed u (a)
and the sum of the weights on maxb2x u (b)  u (a) is strictly less than unity (given
that ∏
c2x
(1  α (c, x)), the weight on u (?), is strictly positive), so that A4 holds.
For sufficiency, let 0 be an arbitrary linear order of X and define ˆ lexicographi-
cally as follows: aˆb iff a  b or a  b and a 0 b. Denote menus by numbering the al-
ternatives in them according to ˆ, as x = fa1, ..., aKgwith aiˆai+1 for all i = 1, ...,K  1.
We will show that for all x 2 X there exist numbers α (a1, x) , ..., α (aK, x) 2 (0, 1) such
that
x  α (a1, x) a1 + (1  α (a1, x)) α (a2, x) a2 + ...+
K 1
∏
i=1
(1  α (ai, x)) α (aK, x) aK
+
K
∏
i=1
(1  α (ai, x))? (6)
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Then by the vNM theorem and A1-A3 there exists a vNM utility u on ∆ (X [ X ) rep-
resenting % such that
u (x) = u
 
α1 (a1, x) a1 + ...+
K 1
∏
i=1
(1  α (ai, x)) α (aK, x) aK +
K
∏
i=1
(1  α (ai, x))?
!
=
K
∑
i=1
i 1
∏
j=1
 
1  α
 
aj, x

α (ai, x) u (ai) +
K
∏
i=1
(1  α (ai, x)) u (?)
(we use the convention that
n
∏
i=m
f (i) = 1 and
n
∑
i=m
f (i) = 0 for all functions f : N !
(0, 1) whenever m > n).
If x consists of only one element, then by A0 and A4 a1  fa1g  ?. By the vNM
axioms and textbook arguments,
fa1g  α (a1, fa1g) a1 + (1  α (a1, fa1g))?
for some unique α (a1, fa1g) 2 (0, 1). So suppose that x consists of two or more el-
ements. There are three cases to consider. In all cases we argue by induction, sup-
posing that the assertion is true for all menus with fewer than K elements and letting
x = fa1, ..., aKg (where recall that aiˆai+1 for all i = 1, ...,K  1).
Case 1: x  xn fa1g. Then a1  x  xn fa1g by A4, and by the vNM axioms there
exists a unique α (a1, x) 2 (0, 1) such that
x  α (a1, x) a1 + (1  α (a1, x)) xn fa1g .
By the inductive hypothesis, there exist α (a2, xn fa1g) , ..., α (aK, xn fa1g) 2 (0, 1) such
that
xn fa1g  α (a2, xn fa1g) a2 + ...+
K 1
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g)) α (aK, xn fa1g) aK
+
K
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g))?
and so by Independence the desired conclusion follows by setting α (ai, x) = α (ai, xn fa1g)
for all i = 2, ...,K. Note that in this case the restriction on α in the statement is satisfied
with equality.
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Case 2: xn fa1g  x. Together with A0 this implies xn fa1g  x  ?, and by the vNM
axioms there exists a unique β 2 (0, 1) with
x  βxn fa1g+ (1  β)?. (7)
Moreover, using A4 yields a1  xn fa1g  x, so that there exists a unique α 2 (0, 1)
such that
xn fa1g  αa1 + (1  α) x.
Having defined α and β in this way, we claim that equation (6) (with the stated prop-
erties on the coefficients) holds by setting the coefficients recursively as follows:
α (a1, x) = αβ (8)
α (ak, x) = γα (ak, xn fa1g) with
γ =
(1  α) β2
k 1
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g))
1  αβ  (1  α) β2
 
k 1
∑
i=2
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g
! (9)
for all k = 2, ...K.
Step 1: α (ak, x) > 0 for all k = 2, ...K. It is obvious that α (a1, x) > 0 given the
admissible values of α and β. For k = 2, ...K, note that the numerator is positive, and
that (given the admissible values of α and β) we have 0 < (1  α) β2 < (1  αβ). So
the denominator is positive given that
k 1
∑
i=2
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g

< 1
To prove this last inequality, observe that (keeping an eye on the summation and prod-
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uct indexes):
k 1
∑
i=2
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g

< 1
, α (a2, xn fa1g) +
k 1
∑
i=3
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g

< 1
,
k 1
∑
i=3
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g

< 1  α (a2, xn fa1g)
,
k 1
∑
i=3
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=3
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g

< 1
, α (a3, xn fa1g) +
k 1
∑
i=4
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=3
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g

< 1
,
k 1
∑
i=4
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=3
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g

< 1  α (a3, xn fa1g)
,
k 1
∑
i=4
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=4
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g

< 1
, ...
, α (ak 1, xn fa1g) (1  α (ak 1, xn fa1g)) < 1
where the last inequality holds true by the inductive hypothesis, since jxn fa1gj =
K  1).
Step 2: α (ak, x) < 1. It is obvious that α (a1, x) < 1 given the admissible values of α
and β. For the other coefficients we show that
α (ak, x)
α (ak, xn fa1g)
< 1 for all k  K, (10)
which implies the result (since α (ak, xn fa1g) < 1 by the inductive hypothesis on the
cardinality of x). We proceed by induction on k (given K). If k = 2, then from the
second line in (8) we have
α (a2, x)
α (a2, xn fa1g)
=
(1  α) β2
1  αβ
< 1.
Now suppose that
α(ak,x)
α(ak,xfa1g)
< 1 for all k for which 2  k  k0   1 < K, and consider
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k = k0. Then
α(ak0 ,x)
α(ak0 ,xnfa1g)
=
(1 α)β2
k0 1
∏
i=2
(1 α(ai,xnfa1g))
1 αβ (1 α)β2
 
k0 1
∑
i=2
α(ai,xnfa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
(1 α(aj,xnfa1g))
! < 1
, (1  α) β2
k0 1
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g))
< 1  αβ  (1  α) β2
 
k0 1
∑
i=2
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g
!
, (1  α) β2 (1  α (ak0 1, xn fa1g))
k0 2
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g))
< 1  αβ  (1  α) β2
0BBB@
k0 2
∑
i=2
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g

+α (ak0 1, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g

1CCCA
, (1  α) β2
k0 2
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g))
< 1  αβ  (1  α) β2
 
k0 2
∑
i=2
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g
!
,
(1 α)β2
k0 2
∏
i=2
(1 α(ai,xnfa1g))
1 αβ (1 α)β2
 
k0 2
∑
i=2
α(ai,xnfa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
(1 α(aj,xnfa1g))
! = α(ak0 1,x)
α(ak0 1,xnfa1g)
< 1
where
α(ak0 1,x)
α(ak0 1,xnfa1g)
< 1 holds by the inductive hypothesis on k. Thus, condition (10)
holds.
Step 3: the α (ak, x) defined in equation (8) satisfy expression (6). By Independence
applied to formula (7), given the definition of α, it must be:
x  βαa1 + β (1  α) x+ (1  β)?. (11)
In turn, using the expression for x from condition (7) and Independence in expres-
sion (11) we have:
x  αβa1 + (1  α) β
2xn fa1g+ (1  β) (1+ β (1  α))?
so that by the inductive hypothesis and Independence:
x  αβa1 + (1  α) β
2
 
α (a2, xn fa1g) a2 +
K 1
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g)) α (aK, xn fa1g) aK
!
+ (1  β) (1+ β (1  α))?+ (1  α) β2
K
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g))? (12)
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Using (8) for any k  2, we have
1  α (ak, x) = 1 
(1 α)β2
k 1
∏
i=2
(1 α(ai,xnfa1g))
1 αβ (1 α)β2
 
k 1
∑
i=2
α(ai,xnfa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
(1 α(aj,xnfa1g))
!α (ak, xn fa1g) =
=
1 αβ (1 α)β2
 
k 1
∑
i=2
α(ai,xnfa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
(1 α(aj,xnfa1g))
!
 (1 α)β2

k 1
∏
i=2
(1 α(ai,xnfa1g))

α(ak,xnfa1g)
1 αβ (1 α)β2
 
k 1
∑
i=2
α(ai,xnfa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
(1 α(aj,xnfa1g))
! =
=
1 αβ (1 α)β2
 
k 1
∑
i=2
α(ai,xnfa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
(1 α(aj,xnfa1g))+α(ak,xnfa1g)
k 1
∏
i=2
(1 α(ai,xnfa1g))
!
1 αβ (1 α)β2
 
k 1
∑
i=2
α(ai,xnfa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
(1 α(aj,xnfa1g))
! =
=
1 αβ (1 α)β2
k
∑
i=2
α(ai,xnfa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
(1 α(aj,xnfa1g))
1 αβ (1 α)β2
 
k 1
∑
i=2
α(ai,xnfa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
(1 α(aj,xnfa1g))
!
so that the numerator of 1   α (ak, x) is equal to the denominators of 1   α (ak+1, x)
and α (ak+1, x). Consequently, the product α (ak, x)
k 1
∏
i=1
(1  α (ai, x)) is a telescopying
product, yielding
α (ak, x)
k 1
∏
i=1
(1  α (ai, x)) = (1  α) β
2
k 1
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g))
which is precisely the coefficient of ak in the lottery on the right hand side of (12). Note
(from Step 2) that in this case the restriction on α in the statement is satisfied with
inequality.
Case 3: xn fa1g  x. Then a1  x  ? and A2 imply that there exists a unique
α 2 (0, 1) with
x  αa1 + (1  α)?.
Applying Independence repeatedly, the above and xn fa1g  x imply that, for all β 2
[0, 1],
x  β (αa1 + (1  α)?) + (1  β) xn fa1g
so that by the inductive hypothesis
x  αβa1 + (1  β)
 
α (a2, xn fa1g) a2 + ...+
K 1
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g)) α (aK, xn fa1g) aK
!
+β (1  α)?+ (1  β)
K
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g))? (13)
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Fix β so that β 2 (0, 1). Then, similarly to case 2, with α and β so defined condition (6)
(with the stated properties on the coefficients) holds by setting recursively
α (a1, x) = αβ (14)
α (ak, x) =
(1  β)
k 1
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g))
1  αβ  (1  β)
 
k 1
∑
i=2
α (ai, xn fa1g)
i 1
∏
j=2
 
1  α
 
aj, xn fa1g
!α (ak, xn fa1g)
A straightforward adaptation of Step 1 and step 2 in the proof of case 2 shows that
α (ak, x) 2 (0, 1) for all k = 1, ...K. To see that (14) retrieves the coefficients in (6)
correctly, again a straightforward adaptation of the proof of step 3 in case 2 shows that
the product α (ak, x)
k 1
∏
i=1
(1  α (ai, x)) is a telescopying product, yielding
α (ak, x)
k 1
∏
i=1
(1  α (ai, x)) = (1  β)
k 1
∏
i=2
(1  α (ai, xn fa1g))
namely the coefficient of ak in the lottery on the right hand side of (6).
B Example 1
Let X = fa, bg, suppose that preferences satisfy A0-A4 and are such that a  b 
fa, bg  fag  fbg, and suppose that u represents preferences with
h 2 X [ X a b fa, bg fag fbg ?
u (.) U pU qpU rU sU 0
where p, q, r, s 2 (0, 1) and s < r < qp. Since α (a, fag)U = u (fag) = rU and
α (b, fbg) pU = u (fbg) = sU we determine the parameters
α (a, fag) = r
α (b, fbg) =
s
p
The other constraint is
α (a, fa, bg)U + (1  α (a, fa, bg)) α (b, fa, bg) pU = u (fa, bg) = qpU
, α (b, fa, bg) =
qp  α (a, fa, bg)
(1  α (a, fa, bg)) p
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Since α (b, fa, bg) 2 (0, 1), it must be that
qp  α (a, fa, bg)
(1  α (a, fa, bg)) p
2 (0, 1), α (a, fa, bg) < qp
(observing that the numerator is less than the denominator if and only if (q  1) p <
(1  p) α (a, fa, bg), which holds true always). Moreover, since the monotonicity con-
dition on α imposes that α (b, fa, bg)  α (b, fbg), it must also be
qp  α (a, fa, bg)
(1  α (a, fa, bg)) p

s
p
, α (a, fa, bg) 
qp  s
1  s
In short, then, we have the restriction
α (a, fa, bg) 2

qp  s
1  s
, qp

Since qp >
qp s
1 s , qp < 1 the interval is not degenerate, and therefore α (a, fa, bg),
while restricted, can never be unique for any configuration of s, q, p.
C Example 2
Let X = fa, bg, a  b  fa, bg  fag  fbg, with u representing these preferences and
defined as
h 2 X [ X a b fa, bg fag fbg ?
u (.) U U pU pqU pqU 0
with U > 0, p, q 2 (0, 1).
Since α (a, fag)U = u (fag) = u (fbg) = α (b, fbg)U = pqU we determine the
parameters α (a, fag) = pq = α (b, fbg). The other constraint is
α (a, fa, bg)U + (1  α (a, fa, bg)) α (b, fa, bg)U = u (fa, bg) = pU
, α (b, fa, bg) =
p  α (a, fa, bg)
1  α (a, fa, bg)
(15)
with α (a, fa, bg) < p to ensure α (b, fa, bg) > 0.
Suppose first that aˆb. As in example 1, since the monotonicity condition on α
requires that α (b, fa, bg)  α (b, fbg), it must also be
p  α (a, fa, bg)
1  α (a, fa, bg)
 pq, α (a, fa, bg) 
p (1  q)
1  pq
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In short, then, we have α (a, fa, bg) 2
h
p(1 q)
1 pq , p

6= ? and α (b, fa, bg) =
p α(a,fa,bg)
1 α(a,fa,bg)
.
Now consider the alternative case bˆa. As the two attention parameters α (a, fa, bg)
and α (b, fa, bg) are completely symmetric, we obtain α (b, fa, bg) 2
h
p(1 q)
1 pq , p

and
α (a, fa, bg) =
p α(b,fa,bg)
1 α(b,fa,bg)
, α (b, fa, bg) =
p α(a,fa,bg)
1 α(a,fa,bg)
. That is, while equation (15) es-
tablishes the same condition regardless of whether aˆb or bˆa, the monotonicity con-
dition imposes a different range of values for the attention parameters. For instance,
setting p = 0.6 and q = 0.8, α (a, fa, bg) = 0.2 and α (b, fa, bg) = 0.5, the requirements
for the case aˆb fail (since for that case α (a, fa, bg) 2 [0.23, 0.6)) while those for bˆa
hold (since 0.5 = α (b, fa, bg) 2 [0.23, 0.6) and α (a, fa, bg) = 0.6 0.51 0.5 = 0.2).
More in general, for any ε 2 (0,min f1  p, p (1  q)g), the case aˆb allows for
α (a, fa, bg) = p  ε and α (b, fa, bg) =
p (p ε)
1 (p ε)
= ε1 p+ε > 0; since however
ε
1 p+ε <
p(1 q)
1 pq given our condition on ε, this value falls outside the range for α (b, fa, bg) when
bˆa.
Finally, we note that taking e.g. the case aˆb, if we also required α (a, fa, bg) 
α (a, fag) = pq, we would have
p (1  q)
1  pq
< pq,
1  q
1  pq
< q, 1  2q+ pq2 < 0
, p <
2q  1
q2
If q is sufficiently small, the rhs in the last inequality is negative, so that the condition
cannot hold.For instance with U = 12, p = 14 and q =
1
3 so that utilities are u (?) = 0,
u (a) = u (b) = 12 > 0, u (fa, bg) = 3, u (fag) = 1 = u (fbg). Then α (a, fag) =
α (b, fbg) = 112 , while from
u (fa, bg) = 3 = α (a, fa, bg) 12+ (1  α (a, fa, bg)) α (b, fa, bg) 12
we obtain
α (b, fa, bg) =
1  4α (a, fa, bg)
4 (1  α (a, fa, bg))
which is positive since by monotonicity it must be α (a, fa, bg)  α (a, fag) = 112 <
1
4 . On the other hand, since by monotonicity we must also have α (b, fa, bg) 
1
12 , it
follows that
1  4α (a, fa, bg)
4 (1  α (a, fa, bg))

1
12
, α (a, fa, bg) 
2
11
>
1
12
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